PIVOT POINTS
PREVENTING AND MANAGING CRITICAL INCIDENTS
WHAT IS A PIVOT POINT

The point at which events and circumstances can either escalate or be contained. The result of a pivot point is change on a personal level, organizational level or occupational level.
In corrections nothing is more routine than change, but change itself is resisted.

“Look at the world around you. It may seem like an immovable, implacable place. It is not, with the slightest push - in just the right place - it can be tipped.”
PIVOT POINTS FOR CORRECTIONS

Beyond our personal stories the nation has several examples of pivot points that served to change how the business of corrections is practiced generating new ideas about how corrections should operate.
LANDMARK EVENTS

Attica Correctional Facility
September 9 – 13, 1971
Ten Hostages Killed, 33 inmates killed
Retaken by New York State Troopers and National guard assault

New Mexico State Penitentiary at Santa Fe
February 2-3, 1980
33 Inmates Killed by other inmates, 12 Hostages, no staff deaths 200 inmates injured by other inmates
Inmates surrendered

SCI – Camp Hill Pennsylvania
October 25-27, 1989 Two separate incidents
38 staff injured, 69 hostages taken or trapped, 70 inmates injured
Retaken by State Police

Southern Ohio Correctional Facility – Lucasville
April 11-21, 1993
One Officer killed, 9 inmates killed, eleven hostages taken
Inmates surrendered
Attica Correctional Facility
September 9 – 13, 1971
Ten Hostages Killed, 33 inmates killed
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The 1971 uprising at Attica State Correctional Facility in New York is what practitioners today think of as the “baseline” for a new era in the profession.
ATTICA: CAUSES

Attica had great meaning to the business of corrections
- It was spawned by national civil unrest and became it’s own political movement
- A motivated inmate population with stated goals and lofty ideals confronted the superior force of the government

Propelled by the conflict generated by
- courts mandating improvements and the
- staff who resisted the loss of power that changes bring combined with
- inmates who were impatient and unprepared to wait to gain new rights

The aftermath of Attica saw the rise of the intellectual theory attributing the riot to:
- A lack of diversity among the officers
- A lack of programming for inmates
- A lack of communication between inmates and staff
ATTICA: WHAT CHANGED

• Virtually every prison system has programs - something that would have been called coddling prisoners before Attica.

• The Attica rule that limited communication to non-verbal cues no longer exists. All prisons encourage communication between inmates and officers.

• Every Corrections system has an internal organization they use to respond to a disturbance. Tactical teams trained to respond to riots came directly from the excesses of relying on outside police or military units.

• The National Institute of Corrections was created to provide a national clearinghouse for corrections issues.
New Mexico State Penitentiary at Santa Fe
February 2-3, 1980
33 Inmates Killed by other inmates, 12 hostages taken, no staff deaths
200 inmates injured by other inmates
Inmates surrendered
The 1980 uprising is significant not because more people died or were taken hostage but by virtue of the blood thirsty manner in which so many were killed and injured.
NEW MEXICO: CAUSES

The riot is a study in the consequences of poor security practices and incompetent management

- The most troubling fact about the New Mexico riot is that everyone knew it was coming and did nothing
  - Security gates were left open allowing inmates to take over whole areas of one of the most secure prisons built to date.
- Supervisors walked the living areas believing themselves to be immune to inmate anger
- Inmates were in large part managed by using informants and setting enmity between prisoners
- Prison staff having no training and no equipment fled allowing inmates to take over areas of the prison leaving informers to their fate
NEW MEXICO: WHAT CHANGED

• The idea of security being more than the building began to sweep the nation.
• Today security challenges and security inspections are routine activities
• The way that informants are used and protected has been rigorously scrutinized
  • Not only are PC inmates screened carefully before going into the status, but while they are in PC they are removed from potential contact with general population and specifically protected especially from their identity becoming known
Two separate incidents
38 staff injured, 69 hostages taken or trapped, 70 inmates injured
Retaken by State Police
SCI CAMP HILL PENNSYLVANIA: CAUSES

- Although significant changes were occurring at the facility, administration failed to recognize indicators and take action.
- A lack of communication and incorrect assumptions caused the presumption of safety when in fact the facility was not secure.
- Resuming normal operations prematurely.
- Providing the media with information that had the potential to incense the inmate population and reignite the riot.
- Failure to provide an adequate riot response by allowing responders to leave the premises.
Camp Hill: What Changed

- The concept of returning to normal operation has taken on new meaning after Camp Hill.
- Assessment after a riot has become a primary focus of the operation that puts down a riot.
- The relationship between officers and administration is seen as critical.
- The role of the officer as first responder who is able to take action and make decisions in a critical incident is now seen as a standard.
- The role of the media as participant in disturbances is taken into consideration.
Southern Ohio Correctional Facility – Lucasville
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One Officer killed, 9 inmates killed, eleven hostages taken
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SOUTHERN OHIO CORRECTIONAL FACILITY AT LUCASVILLE

The 1993 riot at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility at Lucasville is an example of a confident administration versus a resolute inmate population.
Lucasville: Causes

While many factors existed that might have attributed to the riot the stage was set when inmate leaders were confronted and a decision was made to use force if necessary to do TB tests on Muslim inmates on the Monday after Easter. The inmates set their time frames for just after Easter lunch.

- Employees were not advised of the potential issues and confident in their ability to control inmates allowed them to gather on the yard for rec as usual.
- The alert was sounded via a “man down” alarm. Responders had no idea what they were entering into.
- Responders including the shift supervisor rushed headlong into the waiting hands of inmates only to be attacked and some taken hostage.
- Critical time passed during the initial stages of the event allowing the inmates to consolidate their power while employees tried to regroup and determine a course of action.
LUCASVILLE: WHAT changed:

• Correctional agencies began to realize that encouraging open confrontation was a mistake
• The first response to emergencies was rethought to limit the number of hostages taken
• It was realized that the best time to deal with a critical situation is immediately and not by giving inmates time to plan their resistance
• Management of the media was re-examined
Consolidated in 2015 into Presidential Directive #8

Originally issued February 28, 2003, HSPD-5 called for the creation of a National Response Plan (NRP) to “integrate Federal Government domestic prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery plans into one all-discipline, all-hazards plan”.

HSPD# 5 also created the National Incident Management System (NIMS)

http://www.dhs.gov/presidential-policy-directive-8-national-preparedness
NIMS AND THE INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM

“One of the most important 'best practices' that has been incorporated into the NIMS is the Incident Command System (ICS), a standard, on-scene, all-hazards incident management system already in use by firefighters, hazardous materials teams, rescuers and emergency medical teams. The ICS has been established by the NIMS as the standardized incident organizational structure for the management of all incidents.”

http://www.fema.gov/txt/nims/nims_ics_position_paper.txt
ICS HISTORY

ICS was adopted to address problems that arose during the response to interagency response.

- Span of control
- Different response organizational structure
- Inadequate and incompatible communications
- Terminology differences among responders
- Unclear or unspecified incident objectives
CORRECTIONAL PIVOT POINTS AND ICSC

• Recognizing and acting on indicators
  • Taking action in anticipation of incidents

• Empowering line staff to take immediate action as first responders
  • Immediate Assumption of Command

• Mobilizing a unified command organization
  • Consideration of External influences

• The importance of communications and debriefing
  • Focus on demobilization needs

• Practicing response both internally and externally
PREVENTING DISTURBANCES

RECOGNIZING AND ACTING ON INTEL/INDICATORS
Recognizing and Acting on Indicators - Lucasville

• The Warden was dealing with desegregation issues when TB testing was mandated for all inmates. Muslim inmates refused based on religious grounds.

• During a heated meeting between the warden and the imams, the warden advised he was proceeding with the testing regardless of their concerns and the inmates said they would “do what we have to do.”

• The administration decided to wait until the Monday after Easter to lockdown and conduct the tests.

• No steps were taken to evaluate resources or even keep the plan for lockdown confidential from the inmate population.

• Five days later on Easter Sunday, the disturbance occurred.
Recognizing and Acting on Indicators – New Mexico

- Before the New Mexico disturbance it was general knowledge that a riot was imminent largely due to the widespread use of informants.

- On January 31, 1980 an intelligence sharing meeting was held with key staff, police and attorney general representatives.

- They recognized the “danger of a takeover and hostage seizure, but did not conclude that any precautions were advisable.”

- On February 2, 1980 at 1:45 am it took less than 22 minutes for inmates to take control of the entire prison, and just five hours to kill thirteen inmates believed to be informants.
Recognizing and Acting on Indicators - ICSC

The Assessment Mode - “Nothing Showing”

- Evaluate intelligence data
- Coordinate data collection activities and engage post employees in providing input
- Establish and stage resources (including staff, equipment, and supplies)
- Create a command organization in advance for immediate activation, if necessary
- Place emergency response teams on stand-by and develop possible tactical scenarios
INITIAL RESPONSE - ATTICA

- On the day of the riot, knowing there was tension on the yard over an inmate being locked down, a lieutenant was sent to prevent an entire cellblock of inmates from going to recreation.

- When confronted, inmates refused and assaulted staff, charged and overtook a central control area, obtained keys for most of the facility and took over the majority of the prison

- No designated response teams or communications were available at the time
ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND - LUCASVILLE

“When the shift commander (a lieutenant) and the only other lieutenant in the institution both responded to the fight in progress along with a sergeant and all three were engaged in hand to hand combat and injured, the control center and the institution were left with no one at the helm.

A correctional officer might have “stepped up to the plate” to take charge and organize the response to the expanding emergency, but no one did.

In the first 20-40 minutes of the disturbance – the traditional window that determines how much of an institution is lost and how many inmates become involved – Southern Ohio Correctional Facility was operating with no one in charge…In this riot, some staff were taken hostage and/or beaten simply because no one would take command and act decisively”

(Schwartz and Barry 2005)
EMPOWERING LINE STAFF TO TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION ICSC

The one single element of the Incident Command System for Corrections (ICSC) with the greatest potential for slowing or completely halting a potential disturbance is the immediate activation of the initial response mode. When inmates are confronted with the reality that any officer (or staff member) has the ability to summon a response team immediately, fights and minor altercations do not have as much potential to spiral out of control.

- Halts forward momentum of an incident
- Marshalls resources under a single commander
- Can disperse spectators quickly
- Demonstrates a quick and effective response capability on a daily basis
Organized Response
In the absence of unified command, coordination may still be achieved through voluntary mutual cooperation, but this may break down if disagreements arise.

Unity of command was not fully achieved at Camp Hill. Although the State Police had traditionally assumed control over the resolution of Pennsylvania prison riots, the division of authority between the state police and the corrections department had not been clearly delineated before the incident.

During the disturbance, tension developed between the two agencies, and issues that should have been settled before the disturbance (such as the particular type of ammunition that the state police would carry) had to be resolved on the spot, taking up precious time. Since the riot, great strides have been taken to establish a firmer working relationship among State agencies”
Hundreds responded to the Attica riot, representing first responders as well as high-ranking members of each emergency response organization.

The warden and commissioner relinquished responsibility for retaking the prison to the state police and national guard.

In the assault, nine officers were shot and killed.
Unified Command - ICSC

- Today, the Incident Command System for Corrections (ICSC) fits perfectly with National Incident Management System (NIMS). Every responding agency, from local police to the FBI, uses and understands the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and Incident Command System (ICS).

- Using the coordinated system allows for an ease of communication and planning that did not exist in 1971.

- Having correctional employees learn the Incident Command System for Corrections (ICSC) in pre-service training, then use it daily, will assure that when the time comes, every employee will know the system and be able to talk to everyone else as they arrive at the prison to help.
INITIAL COMMAND TO UNIFIED COMMAND

• Prompt action or Initial Response, can halt the progression of an incident
• The organization must grow to accommodate the size of the incident, and the number of responders
• Failure to keep ahead of an incident especially in the beginning allows inmates to take advantage of disorganization
UNIFIED COMMAND - ICSC

Sample Organizational Chart

Unified Command

Fire Dept. Incident Commander
Police Dept. Incident Commander
Public Health Dept. Incident Commander

Unified Incident Objectives

Command Staff

Operations Section
Planning Section
Logistics Section
Finance/Administration Section
INTERAGENCY EXERCISES

“Exercises play a vital role in national preparedness by enabling whole community stakeholders to test and validate plans and capabilities, and identify both capability gaps and areas for improvement.

A well-designed exercise provides a low-risk environment to test capabilities, familiarize personnel with roles and responsibilities, and foster meaningful interaction and communication across organizations.

Exercises bring together and strengthen the whole community in its efforts to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from all hazards.”
“A first responder arriving at an incident scene will quickly recognize what to do and act accordingly. An experienced responder can recognize the subtle cues that the situation may change and modify priorities on the fly. The expert can quickly rule out unimportant information or unusable solutions, almost on a subconscious level, whereas a novice would need much more time to explicitly think through all possibilities.”

Gary Klein, *Intuition at Work*
MANAGING EXTERNAL INFLUENCES - LUCASVILLE

In the Lucasville riot, the media may have played a pivotal role in inciting inmates.

“Media representatives using telephoto lenses and binoculars could read the demands and threats that inmates had painted on sheets and hung out the prison windows. When the media asked a deputy public information officer about the time ultimatums and the threat to kill a hostage, she responded that the inmates had been making such threats and ultimatums since the beginning of the disturbance and that there was no reason to think these were more serious than the earlier deadlines and threats. Her statements were broadcast by the media and heard in the cell blocks, where inmates were monitoring media coverage on televisions and radios. Shortly thereafter, inmates took officer Vallandingham, a young officer very popular with both inmates and staff, from his cell and executed him in cold blood. They then threw his body out to prison staff.”

Schwartz and Barry 2005
“After a day of rioting at Camp Hill, the warden advised the media during a press conference that the melee had been resolved, that the inmate negotiators were not representative of the population, and that none of the rioters’ demands had been met. He also added that no additional staff had been called in and that the state police had left the facility. Inmates watching the broadcast became incensed.

Recognizing the facility’s vulnerability, they resumed their rampage. The facility was virtually demolished during the second night of rioting; sixty-six injuries were reported. Five officers were taken hostage and required medical treatment. Damage estimates to the facility exceeded $15 million.”
MANAGING EXTERNAL INFLUENCES - ICSC
COMMUNICATIONS
COMMUNICATIONS AND DEBRIEFING – CAMP HILL

“After the first disturbance at Camp Hill, some of the essential post-riot tasks were not completed. The count was not cleared, and weapons and other debris were left in the hallways of blocks to which inmates were returned.

Although the locking mechanisms of cell doors had been compromised, inmates were returned to them, and inmates were observed wandering outside their cells throughout much of the night after the first riot.
COMMUNICATIONS – CAMP HILL

The institution’s administrators were largely unaware of these problems because the information never reached them…Unaware of these problems, the superintendent at Camp Hill dismissed all but 25 of the 260 State Police officers who had been called to help quell the first disturbance. The 25-officer contingent fell far short of the number needed to prevent the far more destructive riot that began the next day.”

COMMUNICATIONS AND DEBRIEFING – ICSC

• It is vital to provide progress reports and debriefing to all staff involved

• Scheduled Planning Meetings and Tactical debriefings ensure information is correct and understanding of current situation is accurate
IMPORTANCE OF DEMOBILIZATION

“After the inmates surrender, commanders must coordinate a search for contraband, move inmates to secure units, conduct damage assessments, and ensure that all inmates are accounted for. Medical care must be provided to injured hostages and inmates. Evidence must be collected for future prosecutions....The importance of performing these tasks cannot be overstated. Having resolved the riot, the temptation to lower vigilance and assume that the worst is over may be premature.”

Planning for Demobilization – New Mexico

- Actions taken during the resolution of a riot have long-lasting implications for the future of the institution and the agency.

- This was no more apparent than after the surrender of the inmates at the New Mexico Penitentiary riot in 1980.

“Most inmates spent the first icy nights after the surrender huddled in the yard. Rape, gang attacks, racial violence and official brutality continued in various corners depending on the authorities in charge. Men jockeyed to be under the jurisdiction of the National Guard rather than that of police or corrections officials” (Morris 1983).
DEMOBILIZATION - ICSC

- Incident Commander
- Public Information Officer
- Safety Officer
- Liaison Officer

Operations Section
- Staging Area
  - Branches
    - Air Ops Branch
    - Divisions
    - Groups
      - Strike Team
      - Task Force
      - Single Resource
- Situation Unit
- Demob. Unit
  - Doc. Unit
- Resources Unit

Planning Section
- Demob. Unit
  - Doc. Unit
- Service Branch
  - Commun. Unit
  - Medical Unit
  - Food Unit
  - Ground Support Unit
- Support Branch
  - Supply Unit
  - Facilities Unit

Logistics Section
- Service Branch
- Support Branch

Finance/Admin. Section
- Time Unit
- Procurement Unit
- Cost Unit
- Compensation Claims Unit
CONCLUSION

It is not necessary to learn only from the hard won lessons of past incidents

ICSC provides methods to prevent and manage incidents through:

• Providing for a formal mechanism for gathering intelligence, evaluating indicators and planning for potential inmate reactions
• Empowering line staff to act early
• Immediate establishment of Command
• Universally recognized and compatible organizational structure
• Managing the aftermath from the beginning of the incident

Through planning, collaboration and practice corrections professionals can be prepared for the worst case scenario every day