{"id":322,"date":"2019-01-17T13:23:44","date_gmt":"2019-01-17T18:23:44","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.nlg.org\/nlg-review\/?post_type=article&#038;p=322"},"modified":"2019-01-17T16:31:41","modified_gmt":"2019-01-17T21:31:41","slug":"the-ejusdem-generis-of-a-b-ongoing-asylum-advocacy-for-domestic-violence-survivors","status":"publish","type":"article","link":"https:\/\/www.nlg.org\/nlg-review\/article\/the-ejusdem-generis-of-a-b-ongoing-asylum-advocacy-for-domestic-violence-survivors\/","title":{"rendered":"The Ejusdem Generis of A-B-: Ongoing Asylum Advocacy for Domestic Violence Survivors"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><strong>Linda Kelly<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><em>Linda Kelly is the M. Dale Palmer Professor of Law at the Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law, where she is also Director of the Law &amp; Immigration Clinic.<\/em><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>On June 11, 2018, Attorney General Sessions published his opinion in <em>Matter of A-B- <\/em>1 and overruled <em>Matter of A-R-C-G-<\/em>.2 In so doing, Sessions single\u00adhandedly dismantled an accord between domestic violence survivors, their advocates, and the U.S. government, which was reached less than four years prior and had ended a fifteen-year struggle. Decided in 2014 by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), <em>A-R-C-G- <\/em>was the only decision with national precedential value that provided asylum to domestic violence survivors. It was the culmination of a complicated history, winding through three Presidential administrations and numerous negotiations in the wake of the negative <em>Matter of R-A- <\/em>opinion, which was published and then vacated upon the (ultimately unrealized) hopes that certain regulations would be published.3<\/p>\n<p>Sessions\u2019 overruling of <em>A-R-C-G- <\/em>unleashed a firestorm. Fourteen former Immigration Judges immediately released a joint statement criticizing his <em>A-B- <\/em>decision as one made upon \u201creasons understood only by himself\u201d and calling upon the courts or Congress to \u201creverse this unilateral action and return the rule of law to asylum adjudications.\u201d4 Various immigration courts across the country began issuing detailed briefing instructions in cases affected by <em>A-B-<\/em>.5 Numerous articles and op-eds expressing disapproval were also published.6 On July 11, 2018, USCIS issued a detailed memorandum providing instruc\u00adtion on <em>Matter of A-B- <\/em>to all relevant USCIS officials adjudicating reasonable fear, credible fear, asylum, and refugee claims.7 On July 25, 2018, the U.S. House Committee on Appropriations passed an amendment to block any DHS funding to implement <em>Matter of A-B-<\/em>.8 On August 7, 2018, a federal lawsuit was filed requesting an injunction to block the implementation of <em>Matter of A-B- <\/em>in expedited removal proceedings.9<\/p>\n<p>As the legal and political controversy rages on, domestic violence survivors continue to reach the U.S. borders and appear before U.S. asylum officers and immigration judges seeking asylum. <em>A-B- <\/em>has already significantly reduced the number of positive decisions for domestic violence survivors in credible fear interviews along the U.S. border10 as well as immigration courts.11 Asylum seekers cannot wait for the next possible chapter of legal pronouncements. This article intends to serve as an immediate tool for domestic violence asy\u00adlum seekers and their advocates who now must respond to <em>Matter of A-B-<\/em>.<\/p>\n<p>While <em>A-B- <\/em>systematically discredits <em>A-R-C-G-<\/em>\u2019s interpretation of the asy\u00adlum criteria for domestic violence survivors, it does not definitively disqualify domestic violence asylum claims. Instead, A-B- demands more \u201crigor\u201d in the presentation and adjudication of asylum claims.12 <em>A-B- <\/em>reevaluates each of asylum\u2019s critical criteria: 1) defining membership in a particular social group; 2) evidencing persecution; 3) showing a foreign government\u2019s unwillingness or inability to prevent such persecution; 4) establishing the nexus between such persecution and membership; and 5) proving the non-viability of internal location. Fortunately, as <em>A-B- <\/em>acknowledges, this demand for greater rigor in asylum evaluation can be met by returning to the main source of asylum: <em>In re Acosta<\/em>.13 By following <em>Acosta<\/em>\u2019s roadmap, domestic violence survivors can meet the expectations set forth by <em>A-B-<\/em>.<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li><strong> Membership In A Particular Social Group <\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>For domestic violence survivors, the most fundamental challenge is fitting the domestic violence claim into one of asylum\u2019s limited statutory grounds. Asylum can be granted based on one of the following five factors: \u201crace, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion.\u201d14 The struggle to define \u201cmembership in a particular social group\u201d originates with <em>Acosta<\/em>.15 Relying on the principle of <em>ejusdem generis<\/em>, <em>Acosta <\/em>says \u201cmembership in a particular social group\u201d must be defined consistently with the other four grounds. Such consistency leads to membership in a par\u00adticular social group necessitating a \u201ccommon, immutable characteristic . . . that either is beyond the power of an individual to change or is so fundamental to individual identity or conscience that it ought not be required to change.\u201d16<\/p>\n<p>More recently, the \u201ccommon, immutable characteristic\u201d demand of the par\u00adticular social group standard was compounded by the BIA\u2019s near conflicting demands of \u201cparticularity\u201d and \u201csocial distinction.\u201d \u201cParticularity\u201d signifies that a particular social group\u2019s terms are exacting enough to avoid a group being \u201camorphous,\u201d \u201csubjective,\u201d \u201cinchoate,\u201d or \u201cindeterminate.\u201d17 In contrast to the narrowing of \u201cparticularity,\u201d \u201csocial distinction\u201d considers whether the society in question \u201cperceives, considers, or recognizes persons sharing the particular characteristic to be a group.\u201d18 Combined, the twin requirements of \u201cparticularity\u201d and \u201csocial distinction\u201d force asylum seekers to walk a tightrope. \u201cA particular social group must avoid, consistent with evidence, being too broad to have definable boundaries and too narrow to have larger significance in society.\u201d19 Finally, to avoid circularity, whatever the charac\u00adteristics defining the group, they cannot be rooted in the harm asserted.20 \u201cIf a group is defined by the persecution of its members, then the definition of the group moots the need to establish actual persecution.\u201d21<\/p>\n<p>Against this framework, <em>A-B- <\/em>shatters <em>A-R-C-G<\/em>\u2019s particular social group of \u201cmarried women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relation\u00adship.\u201d Chastising the BIA for its \u201ccursory\u201d analysis and acceptance of DHS\u2019 concession that such a group satisfied the \u201cparticular social group\u201d standard, <em>A-B- <\/em>critically examines and rejects <em>A-R-C-G-<\/em>\u2019s proposed, and comparable, groups.22 <em>A-B- <\/em>concludes that being \u201cunable to leave their relationship\u201d is tantamount to basing the group in the violence because the \u201cinability \u2018to leave\u2019 was created by the harm or threatened harm.\u201d23 The terms \u201cmarried,\u201d \u201cwomen,\u201d and \u201cunable to leave the relationship\u201d were held to be insufficient to demonstrate social distinction\u2014although arguably creating a group narrow enough to satisfy particularity. Sessions also criticized the <em>A-R-C-G- <\/em>Board for accepting DHS\u2019 concession that the proposed group was \u201ccognizable\u201d and noted that DHS provided \u201cno explanation\u201d of support for that concession.24 The BIA\u2019s recognition of Guatemala\u2019s \u201cculture of machismo and family vio\u00adlence\u201d and lack of enforcement of domestic violence laws was not enough for Sessions.25 Instead, he required that the evidence must establish that the class be \u201crecognizable by society at large.\u201d26 According to <em>A-B-<\/em>, \u201cthere is significant room for doubt that Guatemalan society views these women, as horrible as their personal circumstances may be, as members of a distinct group in society, rather than each as a victim of a particular abuser in highly individualized circumstances.\u201d27<\/p>\n<p><strong>Practice Tip: <\/strong><\/p>\n<p>In the face of such challenges, how should a particular social group for domestic violence survivors be defined? Initially, relevant circuit precedent must be reviewed. <em>A-B- <\/em>is a controlling federal administrative precedent, which federal circuits must follow absent contrary circuit precedent.28 Importantly, a few circuits have rejected the social distinction criterion, preferring to rely solely on the \u201ccommon immutable\u201d characteristic and \u201cparticularity\u201d aspects of the \u201cparticular social group\u201d requirement.29 Nevertheless, assuming all three elements must be met, how can the membership in a particular social group be maintained in a post <em>A-B- <\/em>world?<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>a. Recasting the term \u201cUnable to Leave the Relationship\u201d<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Sessions\u2019 characterization of the \u201cunable to leave the relationship\u201d element as a proxy for defining the group through the violence is <em>A-B-<\/em>\u2019s greatest chal\u00adlenge and greatest folly for asylum applicants. Unlike Sessions, the <em>A-R-C-G- <\/em>Board clearly stated that \u201cmarried women in Guatemala unable to leave their relationships\u201d avoided the circularity trapping, since domestic violence did not define the group.30 Presenting evidence in asylum cases that explains this disconnect is now critical. Reliance on basic domestic violence theory is one way to strongly refute <em>A-B-<\/em>\u2019s na\u00efve understanding of domestic violence.<\/p>\n<p>When Lenore Walker, a pioneer in the domestic violence movement, in\u00adtroduced the \u201ccycle of violence\u201d concept in 1979, she defined \u201cthe battered woman\u201d as one subject to an ongoing pattern of tension building, acute battering, and batterer contrition.31 While such work was critical to early explorations of domestic violence, its overemphasis on physical violence gave way to a more nuanced understanding of the many reasons that women stay in an abusive relationship.32<\/p>\n<p>Walker\u2019s \u201ccycle of violence\u201d was eventually replaced with the \u201cpower and control wheel,\u201d which depicts domestic violence as a central hub of \u201cpower and control, attached to spokes illustrating the array of forces compelling a woman to stay.\u201d33 It illustrates that a woman\u2019s inability to leave a relationship is not strictly due to her fear of violence. Love,34 shame,35 children,36 culture,37 religious vows, and scarcity of resources38 are among the many legitimate, non-violence based explanations for a woman\u2019s decision to stay in such a relationship. Evidence of this nature can be submitted through an asylum applicant\u2019s testimony as well as the submission of numerous documented sources within domestic violence literature.39 By providing these kinds of non-violence related explanations, a domestic violence survivor can prove that her \u201cinability to leave the relationship\u201d is not rooted in violence. In so doing, she can avoid the circularity trap set up by <em>A-B-<\/em>.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>b. Eschewing the \u201cUnable to Leave Relationship\u201d Term <\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Beyond recharacterizing the \u201cunable to leave\u201d term, domestic violence survivors can advance other particular social groups theories.40 For example, based on the facts of <em>A-R-C-G-<\/em>, another possible social group may simply be: \u201cMarried Guatemalan Women.\u201d41 This proposed group avoids the \u201ccircular definition in violence\u201d criticism.42 However, it is also clearly at risk of being considered insufficiently \u201cparticular.\u201d Defenses against this latter criticism may include the courts\u2019 repeated recognition that group size does not matter.43 And, backed by <em>ejusdem generis<\/em>, an asylum applicant can cite the numerous large, non-domestic violence groups routinely recognized by courts.44 In this regard, the applicant might also quote Sessions\u2019 own words in <em>A-B-<\/em>: \u201cAlthough the category of protected persons [within a particular group] may be large, the number of those who can demonstrate the required nexus likely is not.\u201d45<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>c. Proposing Alternative \u201cOn Account of\u201d Grounds<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Finally, domestic violence asylum seekers and their advocates must ex\u00adplore and propose all other viable \u201con account of\u201d categories. Does the ap\u00adplicant\u2019s violence and fear have any roots in religion, political opinion, race, or nationality?46 A n a sylum a pplicant n eed o nly s how t hat t he h arm w as motivated \u201cin part\u201d by one of these recognized statutory bases for asylum.47 <em>Fiadjoe v. Attorney General <\/em>exemplifies this tactic.48 In <em>Fiadjoe<\/em>, a Ghanaian woman was awarded asylum after being sexually abused and subjected to servitude by her father from the age of seven, a priest of the Trokosi sect.49 Notably, the asylum award was not framed \u201con account of membership in a particular social group,\u201d such as family or domestic violence. Instead, the Third Circuit relied \u201con account of religion\u201d50 because the Trokosi religious practice of making women and children sacrificial slaves was well documented by the U.S. State Department.51<\/p>\n<ol start=\"2\">\n<li><strong> Persecution <\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><em>A-B- <\/em>also reinforces domestic violence asylum applicants\u2019 need to demon\u00adstrate the three basic prongs of persecution. While statutorily either \u201cpast\u201d <em>or <\/em>a \u201cwell-founded fear\u201d (<em>i.e.<\/em>, future) persecution suffices, <em>Acosta <\/em>and later deci\u00adsions interpret the term \u201cpersecution\u201d to include a showing that the harm is (1) \u201csevere,\u201d52 (2) inflicted in order to \u201covercome a characteristic of the victim,\u201d53 and (3) inflicted by \u201ceither by the government of a country or by persons or an organization that the government was unable or unwilling to control.\u201d 54<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>a. Severity <\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Typically, a domestic violence survivor\u2019s testimony and corroborating evi\u00addence (such as hospital records, police reports, and third party affidavits)55 will leave little doubt that the abuse suffered is \u201crepugnant\u201d56 enough to meet the \u201cseverity\u201d standard.<\/p>\n<p>However, in the wake of <em>A-B-<\/em>, the \u201cpersecution\u201d challenge for domestic violence survivors is demonstrating the nexus between such abuse and the protected characteristic in addition to proving the foreign government\u2019s in\u00adability or unwillingness to control against such acts.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>b. Intent to Overcome <\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Despite <em>R-A- <\/em>having been vacated nearly 20 years ago, Sessions\u2019 <em>A-B- <\/em>opin\u00adion relies heavily upon <em>R-A-<\/em>\u2019s explanation that a domestic violence survivor is targeted by her husband \u201cbecause she was his wife, not because she was a member of some broader collection of women, however defined, whom he believed warranted the infliction of harm.\u201d57 Such an ignorant remark cre\u00adates a non-existent difference. Of course, an abuser targets his wife because she is his wife. However, it is only when she assumes that marital status that she becomes a member of a class vulnerable to persecution because both her husband and her country\u2019s government condone the subjugation of married women. The proposed, albeit never finalized, regulations causing the vacatur of <em>R-A- <\/em>recognized this nexus: \u201c[I]n the domestic violence context, an adjudicator should consider any evidence that the abuser uses violence to enforce power and control over the applicant <u>because <\/u>of the social status that a woman may acquire when she enters into a domestic relationship<em>.<\/em>\u201d<em>58 <\/em><\/p>\n<p><strong>Practice Tip: <\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Certainly, neither the vacated <em>R-A- <\/em>nor the never finalized regulations provide authoritative guidance. Yet the recognition of a nexus between abuse and marital status within the proposed regulations at least provides a strong counter to <em>A-B-<\/em>\u2019s reliance on <em>R-A- <\/em>and its failure to see an abusive partner\u2019s \u201cintent to overcome\u201d his victim. The proposed regulations also draw a useful analogy between slaves persecuted \u201cbecause of race\u201d and domestic violence victims \u201cbecause of membership in a particular social group.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>For example, in a society in which members of one race hold members of another race in slavery, that society may expect that a slave owner who beats his own slave would not beat the slave of his neighbor. It would nevertheless be reasonable to conclude that the beating is centrally motivated by the victim\u2019s race. Similarly, in some cases involving domestic violence, an applicant may be able to establish that the abuser is motivated to harm her because of her gender or because of her status in a domestic relationship. This may be a characteristic that she shares with other women in her society, some of whom are also at risk of harm from their partners because of this shared characteristic. Thus, it may be possible in some cases for a victim of domestic violence to satisfy the \u201con account of\u201d requirement, even though social limitations and other factors result in the abuser having the opportunity, and indeed the motivation, to harm only one of the women who share this characteristic, because only one of these women is in a domestic relationship with the abuser.59<\/p>\n<p>In short, once a slave, or a wife, assumes such status, the persecutor readily relegates that individual into a group which may be subject to harm\u2014even if he is only limited to harming that one individual. Relying on this concededly harsh analogy may help adjudicators recognize a similar nexus for domestic violence survivors.<\/p>\n<ol start=\"3\">\n<li><strong>Government \u201cUnable or Unwilling\u201d to Control the Persecution <\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>The government\u2019s inability or unwillingness to control the private actor is the third prong of persecution discussed by <em>A-B-<\/em>. Keeping with precedent, <em>A-B- <\/em>instructs that when the conduct is by a private actor the asylum applicant must show \u201cmore than\u201d that the government has \u201cdifficulty . . . controlling the private behavior.\u201d60 Rather, the applicant must show that \u201cthe government condoned\u201d the private actions \u201cor at least demonstrated a complete helpless\u00adness to protect the victims.\u201d61<\/p>\n<p><strong>Practice Tip: <\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Because the standard of \u201cunable or unwilling\u201d\u2014otherwise stated as \u201ccom\u00adplete helplessness or condoning\u201d\u2014was remanded without being addressed by the BIA in <em>A-B-<\/em>, the Attorney General\u2019s opinion also cannot make a defini\u00adtive ruling.62 This indecision creates significant opportunities for domestic violence survivors and their advocates. Certainly, the requirement demands more than inaction by the local police.63 \u201cApplicants must show not just that the crime has gone unpunished, but that the government is unwilling or un\u00adable to prevent it.\u201d64 Again, an applicant\u2019s testimony, expert affidavits, other third-party affidavits and country condition documentation proves critical. How many times did the applicant seek help? What police response, if any, occurred? If the police did not investigate the abuse, was the applicant given a reason? Whether or not the applicant sought police assistance, can govern\u00adment condonation or ineptitude be otherwise documented? What do country reports say about the existence of domestic violence laws and the national and\/ or local government\u2019s sincerity in prosecuting domestic violence offenders? These considerations serve as a starting point for satisfying this third factor.<\/p>\n<ol start=\"4\">\n<li><strong> \u201cOn Account Of\u201d Membership in a Particular Social Group <\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>The \u201con account of\u201d nexus in <em>A-B- <\/em>also charges the <em>A-R-C-G- <\/em>Board with not undertaking its own analysis and for simply accepting DHS\u2019s concession that the persecution <em>A-R-C-G- <\/em>suffered \u201cwas, for at least one central reason, on account of her membership in a particular social group.\u201d65 According to Sessions, the <em>A-R-C-G- <\/em>Board \u201ccited no evidence that her ex-husband attacked her because he was aware of, and hostile to, \u2018married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship.\u2019 Rather, he attacked her because of his preexisting relationship with the victim.\u201d66 <em>A-B- <\/em>squarely burdens do\u00admestic violence survivors\u2014like other asylum seekers\u2014to prove the nexus.<\/p>\n<p>This nexus challenge is rooted in Supreme Court precedent. Although not explicit in the refugee definition, the ordinary meaning of the \u201con account of\u201d nexus is that persecution is on account of <em>the victim\u2019s <\/em>\u201crace, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion.\u201d67 The U.S. Supreme Court established the victim-focused standard when Elias-Zacarias fled Guatemala in fear of recruitment by the guerrillas.68 Elias- Zacarias\u2019 request for asylum was rejected.69 No matter how credible, his fear was not of persecution on account of <em>his <\/em>political opinion. No evidence of Elias-Zacarias\u2019 support for the Guatemalan government or political opposi\u00adtion to the guerrilla existed. His resistance to guerrilla recruitment was, at best, for reasons of self-preservation.70 As the Supreme Court reasoned, the guerrillas\u2019 motivation for recruiting Elias-Zacarias was due to an interest in filling their ranks, not a belief that Elias-Zacarias should be targeted for holding a contrary political opinion. The guerrillas\u2019 own political ambitions, independent of Elias-Zacarias, were also \u201cirrelevant.\u201d71<\/p>\n<p>In many asylum cases, establishing the persecutor\u2019s motive can be compli\u00adcated\u2014both as a legal and factual matter. Yet the obvious example of direct retaliation in which the victim expresses a political opinion contrary to that of the persecutor is only one model. When the victim does not personally manifest one of the five factors, persecution may still occur \u201con account of\u201d a protected ground. The persecutor may \u201cimpute\u201d a protected ground (such as political opinion or religious belief) to the victim.72 The persecutor may also have \u201cmixed motives\u201d for engaging in persecution.73 Only one motivation needs to be tied to a protected ground.74 However, whatever the \u201con account of\u201d theory, the victim has the burden of proof. Either by direct or circumstantial evidence, the applicant must establish the persecutor\u2019s motive.75<\/p>\n<p>Against this backdrop, reconsider the challenge for domestic and other per\u00adsonal violence survivors. Oftentimes, it is clear words or direct actions that are key to establishing the \u201con account of\u201d nexus.\u201d Critically, when asylum was granted to a rape victim in <em>In re D-V- <\/em>she was able to testify that the soldiers verbally identified her as a \u201cfanatic for Aristide\u201d while they were raping her and that they wore scarves like those of the Ton Ton Macoutes, \u201cwhich had signified blood and had meant that people and places would be ravaged.\u201d76<\/p>\n<p>By contrast, no \u201con account of\u201d nexus was found in the case of Castillo- Hernandez.77 Castillo-Hernandez, an indigenous Guatemalan woman targeted and raped by uniformed individuals, claimed persecution because of her Mayan ethnicity or imputed political opinion of neutrality in post-civil war Guatemala.78 Amnesty International reports were introduced to establish that the sexual crimes and killings of Guatemalan women were linked to gender. Yet, in denying Castillo-Hernandez\u2019s claim, the Eleventh Circuit stated, \u201c[The] roving gang of ex-guerillas . . . made no comments indicating they were at\u00adtacking her and her mother because they were Mayan and spoke Canjobal or because they thought the women had remained neutral during Guatemala\u2019s civil war almost ten years earlier. The attackers\u2019 actions were consistent with private acts of violence and not persecution based on a protected factor.\u201d79<\/p>\n<p>Predictably, in many cases of domestic violence tangible demonstrable evidence is lacking. The standard is misguided if not offensive. How often will an individual raping his intimate partner articulate his motivations? And more importantly, why should a survivor have to depend upon the willing\u00adness of a perpetrator to explain himself? The \u201cone central reason\u201d standard seems to empower the perpetrator and leave the victim without a legal haven.<\/p>\n<p>Fortunately, while a persecutor\u2019s words and direct actions are invaluable, asylum\u2019s overarching \u201creasonable person\u201d standard (embodied in well-founded fear) does not require an applicant to establish conclusively why persecution happened.80 \u201cRather, an asylum applicant \u2018bear[s] the burden of establish\u00ading facts on which a reasonable person would fear that the danger arises on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.\u201d81<\/p>\n<p><strong>Practice Tip: <\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Certainly, any statements by the persecutor regarding his dominant, pa\u00adtriarchal position in relation to his intimate partner and women in similar relationships are key. Expert and other third-party affidavits as well as country condition documentation regarding the role of women in such relationships are also invaluable. However, domestic violence survivors and their advocates must also emphasize the reasonable person standard and the need for ejusdem generis review.<\/p>\n<p>In other \u201con account of\u201d determinations, courts often conclude there is no other \u201creasonable explanation\u201d for the persecution other than the asserted nexus.82 By analogy, a perpetrator of domestic violence may have a \u201cpreexist\u00ading personal relationship\u201d with his parents, his siblings, and friends. Yet these individuals are not subject to domestic violence. The persecution is saved only for his most intimate partner. Contrasting an abuser\u2019s behavior vis-\u00e0-vis differing personal relationships debunks Sessions\u2019 claim that domestic violence only occurs because of the \u201cpre-existing relationship.\u201d Apart from the applicant\u2019s membership in the particular social group, no other reasonable explanation exists for the domestic violence.<\/p>\n<p>Finally, courts must be reminded that Sessions\u2019 remark that ARCG was attacked by her husband \u201cbecause of his preexisting personal relationship with [her]\u201d83 does not dispositively prevent domestic violence survivors from establishing the nexus. Sessions is guilty of the very criticism he levied on the BIA\u2014reaching a conclusion without conducting an evaluation.84 In any event, the factual conclusion regarding the nexus in one case does not control another.<\/p>\n<ol start=\"5\">\n<li><strong> Internal Relocation <\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>While not undertaking any evaluation of the <em>A-B- <\/em>facts, Sessions reminds asylum adjudicators to incorporate this element.85 As a general matter, when an asylum applicant has otherwise met the criteria for asylum, the status may nevertheless be denied if internal relocation is a legally recognized alterna\u00adtive.86 However, the internal relocation standard <em>and <\/em>the burden of proof vary <em>both <\/em>upon whether an asylum applicant has established a case of past <em>or <\/em>a case of well-founded fear of (<em>i.e. <\/em>future) persecution and upon whether the persecutor is a government or non-government agent.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>a. Past Persecution <\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>When a case of past persecution has been established, a rebuttable pre\u00adsumption arises that the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution. It is then DHS\u2019s burden to rebut this presumption by meeting two discrete considerations: (1) the applicant\u2019s ability to relocate and (2) the reasonable\u00adness of relocation.87<\/p>\n<p>In demonstrating the applicant\u2019s ability to relocate, DHS must first identify an area of the country where \u201cthe risk of persecution falls below the well-founded fear level\u201d and then prove that such an area is \u201cpractically, safely and legally\u201d accessible to the applicant.88 Once ability is established, the reason\u00adableness of relocation factor considers whether \u201cunder all the circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect the applicant to do so.\u201d89 The non-exhaustive list of circumstances relevant to the reasonableness criterion includes all country conditions (<em>e.g.<\/em>, civil strife, including economic, political, social, geographical, legal) as well as any personal conditions (<em>e.g. <\/em>age, gender, health, social and familial ties) that might make internal relocation unreasonable.90<\/p>\n<p>When DHS meets its two-step burden, an individual who has suffered past persecution may still be awarded asylum as a discretionary matter\u2014because DHS has merely rebutted the presumption of well-founded fear\u2014by showing \u201ccompelling reasons for being unwilling or unable to return\u201d91 or \u201ca reasonable possibility that he or she may suffer other serious harm upon removal to that country.\u201d92 This humanitarian award of asylum understands that the severity of the past persecution makes it inhumane to require an individual to return to the very country where such atrocities occurred.93<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>b. Well-Founded Fear of Persecution <\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>In contrast to past persecution claims, when eligibility for asylum rests strictly upon a well-founded fear of persecution and nongovernmental per\u00adsecution, the applicant retains the internal relocation burden and must meet a higher standard. In cases of nongovernmental persecution, the applicant bears the burden of showing \u201cthat it would not be reasonable for him or her to relocate.\u201d94 On the other hand, in cases of government-sponsored persecution, the burden shifts to DHS to show the reasonableness of relocation.95<\/p>\n<p><strong>Practice Tip: <\/strong><\/p>\n<p>For domestic violence survivors, the internal relocation hurdle may be relatively easy to clear after the applicant has successfully met all of asylum\u2019s other exceptional demands.96 As <em>A-B- <\/em>recognizes, the severity of the violence suffered by domestic violence survivors is often so \u201crepugnant\u201d 97that domestic violence claims will typically fall into the past persecution realm, thus placing the heavy \u201cinternal relocation\u201d burden on the DHS. However, this in no way suggests that asylum applicants can overlook the internal relocation criteria. Applicants must counter any DHS arguments of relocation with both general country conditions and individual considerations.<\/p>\n<p>Again, recognizing the dynamics of domestic violence is critical. Does the persecutor evidence a desire or ability to find the victim?98 Has the victim\u2019s isolation from family or friends eliminated a support system? Is the victim relying on physical treatment or other mental and social services in the United States that are not available in the home country?<\/p>\n<p>Likewise, a domestic violence asylum applicant cannot presume her facts will establish past persecution. Arguing in the alternative for asylum strictly upon a well-founded fear puts the \u201creasonableness of relocation\u201d burden on the applicant. Sessions\u2019 remarks show the height of this standard: \u201cWhen the applicant has suffered personal harm at the hands of only a few specific indi\u00adviduals, internal relocation would seem more reasonable than if the applicant were persecuted, broadly, by her country\u2019s government.\u201d99 Evidence unique to the applicant\u2019s relationship to the persecutor, previous attempts to leave the relationship, the persecutor\u2019s ability and inclination to find the victim, as well as the home country\u2019s ability to protect domestic violence victims is therefore relevant. The domestic violence applicant can also introduce domestic violence literature or expert witnesses to show how the dynamics of domestic violence drive domestic violence perpetrators to great lengths to find their victims.100<\/p>\n<p><strong>Conclusion <\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Over twenty-five years ago when I began advocating for asylum seekers, Esther Olavarria Cruz, already a seasoned asylum attorney said to me: \u201cAsylum cases are like climbing a mountain. There are so many places where you can fall off.\u201d <em>Matter of A-B- <\/em>is a powerful reminder of the challenges presented by asylum law. However, with careful preparation, strong corroboration, and strict adherence to <em>ejusdem generis<\/em>, asylum remains within grasp for all asylum seekers, including domestic violence survivors.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>NOTES <\/strong><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li><em>Matter of A-B-, <\/em>27 I&amp;N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018).<\/li>\n<li><em>Matter of A-R-C-G-<\/em>, 26 I&amp;N Dec. 338 (BIA 2014).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"3\">\n<li><em>Matter of R-A-<\/em>, 22 I&amp;N Dec. 906 (BIA 1999) (en banc), vacated, 22 I&amp; N Dec. 906 (AG 2001), remanded, 23 I&amp;N Dec. 694 (A.G. 2005), remanded and stay lifted, 24 I&amp;N Dec. 629 (AG 2008). In 1999, the Board in <em>Matter of R-A- <\/em>first considered whether \u201cmember\u00adship in a particular social group\u201d could be because of domestic violence. Denying the claim, the <em>en banc <\/em>Board rejected the cognizability of the proposed particular social group \u201cGuatemalan women who have been involved intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who believe that women are to live under male domination.\u201d <em>Matter of R-A-<\/em>, 22 I&amp;N Dec. 906, 918 (BIA 1999) (en banc). In 2001, Attorney General Janet Reno vacated <em>Matter of R-A-<\/em>, remanding it for the Board\u2019s reconsideration. Her instructions were a result of asylum regulations which had been proposed on behalf of domestic vio\u00adlence survivors on relevant asylum terminology including \u201cpersecution,\u201d \u201cmembership in a particular social group,\u201d and \u201con account of\u201d a protected characteristic. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588. 76,597-98 (proposed Dec. 7, 2000). In 2003, Attorney General John Ashcroft certified <em>Matter of R-A- <\/em>for his review and remanded it to the Board in 2005 \u201cin light of the final rule.\u201d <em>Matter of R-A- 23<\/em>, I&amp;N Dec 694 (A.G. 2005). However, the proposed regulations were never finalized. In 2008, Attorney General Michael Mukasey certified the case for his review and issued an order that it be reconsidered without the need to await the final regulations. <em>Matter of R-A-<\/em>, 24 I&amp;N Dec. 629 (A.G. 2008). Yet, because the parties then stipulated to asylum, the BIA ultimately never issued another published opinion in <em>Matter of R-A-<\/em>. R-A- was granted asylum on December 10, 2009. For a summary review of the procedural history of <em>Matter of R-A- <\/em>see <em>Matter of A-R-C-G-<\/em>, 26 I&amp;N Dec. 388, 390-391 (BIA 2014). For ongoing reliance on <em>Matter of R-A- <\/em>and the relevant proposed (never finalized) asylum regulations, see <em>infra <\/em>notes 57-59 and accompanying text.<\/li>\n<li>Statement in Response to Sessions\u2019 Decision in <em>Matter of A-B- <\/em>by Retired Immigration Judges and Former Members of the Board of Immigration Appeals (June 11, 2018), <em>available at <\/em>https:\/\/www.lexisnexis.com\/LegalNewsRoom\/immigration\/b\/immigra\u00adtion-law-blog\/posts\/statement-in-response-to-session-s-decision-in-matter-of-a-b-by-retired-immigration-judges-and-former-members-of-the-board-of-immigration-appeals<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"5\">\n<li>On file with author (briefing schedules of EOIR Immigration Courts in Arlington, VA and Newark, NJ).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"6\">\n<li>Michelle Bran\u00e9, Women Fleeing Domestic Violence Deserve Asylum, WashingtonPost (June13, 2018); Katlie Benner and Caitlin Dickerson, Sessions Says Domestic and Gang Violence are not Grounds for Asylum, New York Times (June 11, 2018); Elise Foley, Trump Administration Restricts Asylum Access for Victims of Gang and Domestic Violence, HuffingtonPost (June 11, 2018); Jane Fonda and Karen Musalo, Her Husband Beat Her and Raped Her. Jeff Sessions Might Deport Her, New York Times (May 17, 2018).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"7\">\n<li>USCIS, Guidance for Processing Reasonable Fear, Credible Fear, Asylum, and Refugee Claims in Accordance with <em>Matter of A-B<\/em>, Policy Memorandum (July 11, 2018).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"8\">\n<li>House Committee on Appropriations, Department of Homeland Security House Appropriations Bill 115 H.R. ___ (July 25, 2018), <em>available at <\/em>https:\/\/docs.house.gov\/ meetings\/AP\/AP00\/20180725\/108623\/HMKP-115-AP00-20180725-SD004.pdf; <em>see also <\/em>Noah Lanard, Republicans Voted to Block Jeff Sessions\u2019 Attacks on Asylum Seekers Fleeing Domestic Violence, Mother Jones (July 26, 2018), <em>avilable a<\/em>t https:\/\/www. motherjones.com\/politics\/2018\/07\/republicans-voted-to-block-jeff-sessions-attacks-on-asylum-seekers-fleeing-domestic-violence\/.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"9\">\n<li><em>Grace et al. v. Sessions<\/em>, Case 1:18-cv-01853 (D.C. DCt 2018). For further discussion of credible fear and expedited removal proceedings see Stephen H. Legomsky &amp; Cristina M. Rodriguez, Immigration And Refugee Law And Policy (6th ed. 2015).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"10\">\n<li>Noah Lanard, Jeff Sessions Has Been Targeting Asylum-Seekers Fleeing Domestic Violence. It\u2019s Been \u201cDevastating,\u201d Mother Jones (July 26, 2018).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"11\">\n<li><em>In Re __ <\/em>(Unpublished BIA, June 15, 2018) (on file with author).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"12\">\n<li><em>Matter of A-B-<\/em>, <em>supra <\/em>note 1 at 333.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"13\">\n<li>19 I&amp;N Dec. 211 (BIA 1985).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"14\">\n<li>8 U.S.C.A. \u00a7\u00a7 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(a).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"15\">\n<li><em>In re Acosta<\/em>, 19 I&amp;N Dec. 211 (BIA 1985), <em>overruled on other grounds, in re Mogharrabi<\/em>, 19 I&amp;N Dec. (BIA 1989).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"16\">\n<li><em>Ibid. <\/em><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"17\">\n<li><em>In re A-M-E- &amp; J-G-U-<\/em>, 24 I&amp; N Dec. 69 (BIA 2007).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"18\">\n<li><em>In re W-G-R-<\/em>, 26 I&amp; N Dec. 208, 217 (BIA 2014).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"19\">\n<li><em>Matter of A-B-<\/em>, <em>supra <\/em>note 1 at 336.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"20\">\n<li><em>See, e.g., M-E-V-G-<\/em>, 26 I&amp; N Dec. at 236, n. 11; W-G-R-, <em>supra <\/em>note 18 at 215.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"21\">\n<li><em>Matter of A-B-<\/em>, <em>supra <\/em>note 1 at 335.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"22\">\n<li><em>Ibid<\/em>. at 333-334. In <em>A-R-C-G-<\/em>, DHS conceded that A-R-C-G- was a member of a \u201ccog\u00adnizable\u201d social group that was both particular and socially distinct. The Board thus avoided considering whether A-R-C-G- could establish the existence of a cognizable particular social group without defining the group by the fact of persecution.\u201d).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"23\">\n<li><em>Ibid. <\/em>at 335.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"24\">\n<li><em>Ibid. <\/em>at 336.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"25\">\n<li><em>Ibid. <\/em>(relying on <em>A-R-C-G-<\/em>, <em>supra <\/em>note 2 at 392).<\/li>\n<li><em>Ibid. <\/em><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>27 <em>Ibid. <\/em><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"28\">\n<li>\u201cThe BIA should be accorded <em>Chevron <\/em>deference as it gives ambiguous statutory terms \u2018concrete meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication.\u201d <em>Negusie v. Holder<\/em>, 555 U.S. 511, 517 (2009) (relying on <em>Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., <\/em>467 U.S. 837 (1984)). <em>Chevron\u2019s <\/em>two-step analysis first asks, \u201cwhether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.\u201d <em>Chevron<\/em>, 467 U.S. at 842. Secondly, \u201c[i]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency\u2019s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute\u201d <em>Id. <\/em>at 843; <em>see also Nat\u2019l Cable &amp; Telecomms. Ass\u2019n v. Brand X Internet Servs.<\/em>, 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"29\">\n<li>In 2008, the BIA heightened the standard \u201cparticular social group\u201d by adding the two requirements of \u201csocial visibility\u201d and \u201cparticularity\u201d to the traditional standard of \u201ccommon immutable characteristic. <em>In re E-A-G-<\/em>, 24 I&amp;N Dec 591, 596 (BIA 2008), <em>In re S-E-G-<\/em>, 24 I&amp;N 579, 584 (BIA 2008). Criticism of the new terms included de\u00adcisions by the Third, Seventh and Ninth Circuits rejecting part or all the additional requirements. <em>Valdiviezo-Galdamez II. v. U.S. Att\u2019y Gen.<\/em>, 663 F3d 582, 606-08 (3rd Cir 2011) (finding elements of social visibility and particularity \u201cinconsistent\u201d with prior Board decisions and that the BIA had not established a \u201cprincipled reason\u201d for adopting inconsistent requirements), r<em>emanded sub nom, In re M-E-V-G-, <\/em>26 I&amp;N Dec. 227 (BIA 2014); <em>Gatimi v. Holder<\/em>, 578 F3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2009) (rejecting \u201csocial visibility\u201d); <em>Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder<\/em>, 707 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2013) (clarify\u00ading while reserving assessment of validity of \u201cparticularity\u201d and \u201csocial visibility\u201d). Responding to such criticism, in 2014, the BIA re-interpreted and modified the new terms and changed \u201csocial visibility\u201d to social distinction.\u201d <em>Matter of M-E-V-G-<\/em>, 26 I&amp;N Dec. 227 (BIA 2014), and <em>Matter of W-G-R-<\/em>, 26 I&amp; N Dec. 208 (BIA 2014), <em>affirmed in part, vacated and remanded in part on other grounds sub nom. Reyes v. Lynch<\/em>, 842 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2016). Such changes have resulted in the Third Circuit recent adop\u00adtion of the \u201cparticularity\u201d and \u201csocial distinction\u201d terms, finding them to be compliant with <em>Chevron <\/em>standards. <em>S.E.R.L. v. Attorney General<\/em>, No. 894 F3d 535 (3rd Cir. 2018). After it\u2019s earlier rejection of \u201csocial visibility,\u201d the Seventh Circuit has failed to use or discuss \u201csocial distinction.\u201d <em>R.R.D. v. Holder<\/em>, 746 F.3d 807 (7th Cir. 2014). For earlier discussions of the \u201csocial distinction\u201d and \u201cparticularity\u201d terms and their origins see Linda Kelly, \u201cOn Account Of\u201d Private Violence: The Personal\/Political Dichotomy of Asylum\u2019s Nexus 98, 108-118 (2017); Linda Kelly, The New Particulars of Asylum\u2019s \u201cParticular Social Group,\u201d 36 Whittier Law Rev. 219 (2015).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"30\">\n<li><em>A-R-C-G-<\/em>, <em>supra <\/em>note 2 at 393, n. 14<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"31\">\n<li>\u201cA battered woman is a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without any concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationships with men. Furthermore, to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.\u201d Lenore E. Walker, The Battered Woman, xv (1979).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"32\">\n<li>Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 28-34, 53055 (1991) (criticizing the physical definition of domestic violence and its failure to address the \u201cpower and control, domination and subordination\u201d dimensions); Joan S. Meier, Notes from the Underground: Integrating Psychological and Legal Perspectives on Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21 Hofstra L. Rev. 1295, 1317-22 (1993) (focusing on the patriarchal dynamics of domestic violence); G Chezia Carraway, Violence Against Women of Color, 43 Stan. L. Rev.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>1301, 1305-1306 (1991) (relying on the patriarchal definition of domestic violence to include \u201ceconomic violence, cultural violence, legislative violence, medical violence, spiritual violence, emotional violence and educational violence).<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"33\">\n<li>The \u201cpower and control wheel, otherwise known as the \u201cDuluth Model\u201d is attributed to the Duluth Domestic Abuse Intervention Project (DAIP) in Duluth, Minnesota. From a central hub of \u201cpower and control,\u201d the wheel\u2019s outer time is a circle of physical and sexual violence. However, this central \u201cpower and control\u201d is connected to the outer circle through spokes identified as such additional forces as using children, minimiz\u00ading, denying, blaming, isolating, relying upon male privilege, coercing, threatening, intimidating, and abusing both emotionally and economically. Ellen Pence &amp; Michale Paymar, Education Groups For Men Who Batter: The Duluth Model 1-15 (1993).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"34\">\n<li>Walker, <em>supra <\/em>note 31 at 27 (recognizing the love which is restored during periods of contrition in the cycle of violence).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"35\">\n<li>Mahoney, <em>supra <\/em>note 32 at 8 (acknowledging her reluctance to tell her own story).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"36\">\n<li>R. Emerson Dobash &amp; Russell Dobash, Violence Against Wives 148 (1979) (finding children to be the most cited reason a battered woman stays); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women\u2019s Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 589, 614-615 (1986) (recognizing that a woman\u2019s \u201cconnected nature\u201d can result in making decisions regarding her own welfare in connection with consideration for both her spouse\u2019s and children\u2019s interests).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"37\">\n<li>Kimberl\u00e9 Crenshaw, Panel Presentation on Cultural Battery, 25 U.Tol.L.Rev. 891, 893 (1995) (acknowledging that a victim of abuse does not want to leave, but simply wants the violence to stop); Kimberl\u00e9 Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 1241 (1991).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"38\">\n<li>Catherine T. Kenney &amp; Karen R. Brown, Now Legal Def. &amp; Educ. Fund, Report From The Front Lines: The Impact Of Violence On Poor Women (1996); Martha F. Davis &amp; Susan J. Kraham, Protecting Women\u2019s Welfare in the Face of Violence, 22 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1141 (1995).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"39\">\n<li>See <em>supra <\/em>notes 31-38 and accompanying text. For an additional sampling of the volumes of works dedicated to the patriarchal use of domestic violence see e.g., Ola W. Barnett &amp; Alyce D. Laviolette, It Could Happen To Anyone: Why Battered Women Stay (2d ed. 2000); R. Emerson Dobash Et Al., Changing Violence Men (2000); Dobash &amp; Dobash, <em>supra <\/em>note 36; Donald G. Dutton, The Domestic Assault Of Women: Psychological And Criminal Justice Perspectives (1995); Feminist Perspectives On Wife Abuse (Kersti Yllo &amp; Michele Bograd eds., 1988); Jean Giles-Sims, Wife Battering: A Systems Approach (1983); Jerry M. Goffman, Self-Help Counseling For Men Who Batter Women (1983); Edward W. Gondolf &amp; David M. Russell, Man To Man: A Guide For Men In Abusive Relationships (1987); Edward W. Gondolf, Men Who Batter: An Integrated Approach For Stopping Wife Abuse (1985); Neil S. Jacobson &amp; John Gottman, When Men Batter Women: New Insights Into Ending Abusive Relationships (1998); Edward Jukes, Men Who Batter Women (1999); Legal Responses To Wife Assault: Current Trends And Evaluations (N. Zoe Hilton ed., 1993), Catharine A. Mackinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses On Life And Law, 85-92 (1987); Pence &amp; Paymar, <em>supra <\/em>note 33; Anson Shupe Et Al., Violence Men, Violent Couples: The Dynamics Of Domestic Violence (1987); Daniel Jay Sonkin Et Al., The Male Batterer: A Treatment Approach (1985); Richard A. Stordeur &amp; Richard Stille, Ending Men\u2019s Violence Against Their Partners: One Road To Peace (1989); Walker, <em>supra <\/em>note 31; David B. Wexler, Domestic Violence 2000: An Integrated Skills Program For Men: Group Leader\u2019s Manual (2000); Woman Battering: Policy Responses (Michael Steinman ed., 1991); Cynthia Grant Bowman, The Arrest Experiments: A Feminist Critique, 83 J. Crim. L. &amp; Criminology 201 (1992); Donald G. Dutton &amp; James J. Browning, Power Struggles And Intimacy Anxieties As Causative Factors Of Wife Assault, In Violence In Intimate Relationships 163 (Gordon W. Russell Ed., 1988); Ruth E. Fleury, Missing Voices: Patterns Of Battered Women\u2019s Satisfaction With The Criminal Legal System, 8 Violence Against Women 181 (2002); Carol Gregory &amp; Edna Erez, The Effects Of Batterer Intervention Programs: The Battered Women\u2019s Perspective, 8 Violence Against Women 206 (2002); Demie Kurz, Physical Assault By Husbands: A Major Social Problem, In Current Controversies On Family Violence 88 (Richard Gelles &amp; Donileen R. Loseke eds., 1993); Mahoney, <em>supra <\/em>note 32; Elizabeth M. Schneider, Making Reconceptualization of Violence Against Women Real, 58 Alb. L. Rev. 1245 (1995); Malinda L. Seymore, Isn\u2019t It a Crime: Feminist Perspectives on Spousal Immunity and Spousal Violence, 90 Nw. U.L. REV. 1032 (1996); Reva B. Siegel, \u201cThe Rule of Love\u201d: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 Yale L.J. 2117).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"40\">\n<li>Asylum applicants bear the burden of specifically delineating her proposed particular social group before the Immigration Judge. <em>Matter of W-Y-C- &amp; H-O-B-, <\/em>27 I&amp;N Dec. 189 (BIA 2018).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"41\">\n<li>Clearly, a different fact pattern will require changing the nationality, or if the applicant is not married casting the group through such terms as \u201cWomen of X Country\u201d in inti\u00admate relationships or \u201cWomen of X Country with Children living with their partners.\u201d<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"42\">\n<li>It will also avoid a much earlier criticism that the Particular Social Group were often being held to a higher standard by having to conflate various aspects of their claims, <em>see e.g, Matter of Kasinga<\/em>, 21 I&amp;N Dec 357, 373 (BIA 1996) (Rosenberg concurrence); Linda Kelly, Republican Mothers, Bastards\u2019 Fathers and Good Victims, Discarding Citizens and Equal Protection through the Failures of Legal Images, 51 Hastings L.J. 557, 591-592 (discussing <em>Kasinga\u2019s <\/em>particular social group)<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"43\">\n<li>\u201c[W]e have rejected the notion that a persecuted group may simply represent too large a portion of a population to allow its members to qualify for asylum\u2026[T]he size and breadth of a group alone does not preclude a group from qualifying for asylum. <em>Perdomo v. Holder<\/em>, 611 F.3d 662, 669 (9th Cir. 1962).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"44\">\n<li>Large groups accepted by the BIA include <em>In re H-<\/em>, 21 I&amp;N Dec 337 (BIA 1997) (Somali clans); <em>In re V-T-S-<\/em>, 21 I&amp; N Dec. 77 (BIA 1993) (Filipinos of Chinese ancestry). Numerous circuit opinions also support large groups. <em>See e.g., Singh v. INS<\/em>, 94 F3d 1353, 1359 (9th Cir. 1996) (\u201crace\u201d for Indo-Fijians, constituting half the population of Fiji); <em>Mihalev v. Ashcroft<\/em>, 388 F3d 772, 726 (9th Cir. 2004) (\u201cgypsies\u201d); <em>Harouni v. Gonzales<\/em>, 399 F.3d. 1163, 1172 (9th Cir 2005) (alien homosexuals); <em>Hernandez-Montiel v. I.N.S<\/em>., 225 F3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000) (Mexican men with female sexual identities); <em>Mohammed v. Gonzales<\/em>, 400 F.3d 785, 798 (9th Cir. 2005) (\u201cSomali females\u201d).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"45\">\n<li><em>Matter of A-B-<\/em>, <em>supra <\/em>note 1 at 338 (quoting <em>Cece v Holder<\/em>, 733 F.3d 662, 673 (7<sup>th <\/sup>Cir. 2013).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"46\">\n<li>For my pre <em>Matter of A-B- <\/em>advocacy of alternative theories for domestic violence survivors <em>see <\/em>Kelly, \u201cOn Account of Private Violence, <em>supra <\/em>note 29<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"47\">\n<li><em>See e.g., Uwais v. U.S. Att\u2019y Gen.<\/em>, 478 F.3d 513, 517 (2nd Cir. 2007). The applicant must show the protected ground was \u201cone central reason\u201d for the persecution. 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). \u201cIt need not be the sole nor primary reason.\u201d <em>Gomez-Rivera v. Sessions<\/em>, 897 F3d 995, 998 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting <em>Marroquin-Ochoma v. Holder<\/em>, 574 F.3d 574, 577 (8th Cir. 2009) (\u201c[T]he persecution need not be solely, or even predominantly, on account of the [protected ground.]\u201d). \u201cBut, the protected ground \u2018cannot be merely inci\u00addental or tangential\u2019 to another reason for the persecution.\u201d <em>Gomez-Rivera<\/em>, id (quoting <em>In Re J-B-N- &amp; S-M-<\/em>, 24 I. &amp; N. Dec. 208, 213 (BIA 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"48\">\n<li>411 F.3d 135 (3rd Cir. 2005).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"49\">\n<li><em>Ibid.<\/em><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"50\">\n<li><em>Ibid. <\/em>at 160.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"51\">\n<li><em>Ibid. <\/em>at 161-64.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"52\">\n<li>For a discussion of the level of physical or economic harm required <em>see e.g., Matter of Acosta, supra <\/em>note at 222; <em>see also Matter of T-Z-<\/em>, 24 I&amp;N Dec. 163, 172-73 (BIA 2007).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"53\">\n<li><em>Kasinga<\/em>, supra note at 365, indicating that while persecution may also be inflicted to \u201cpunish\u201d the victim for such characteristic, punishment is not essential.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"54\">\n<li><em>Matter of Acosta<\/em>, <em>supra <\/em>note 15 at 222.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"55\">\n<li>Since 2005, credibility determinations for asylum applicants are subject to the REAL ID Act. Pub. L. No. 109-13 div. B, \u00a7\u00a7 101(a)(3), 119 Stat. 231, 303 (2005) (codified at 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)). While an applicant\u2019s testimony alone may be credible, there is \u201cno presumption of credibility\u201d. 8 U.S.C. \u00a71158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Credibility is based on a \u201ctotality of the circumstances\u201d allowing negative credibility determinations to be based on identified inconsistencies which are unrelated to an applicant\u2019s core asylum claim: \u201cConsidering the totality of circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility determination on\u2026the consistency between the applicant\u2019s or witness\u2019s written and oral statements\u2026, the internal consistency of each such statement, [and] the consistency of such statements with other evidence of record\u2026, without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood, goes to the heart of the applicant\u2019s claim, or any other factor.\u201d Id. Additionally, the REAL ID Act\u2019s requires providing all corroborating evidence which is \u201creasonably available\u201d. 8 U.S.C. \u00a71158(b)(2).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"56\">\n<li><em>Matter of A-B-, supra <\/em>note 1 at 337.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"57\">\n<li><em>Ibid<\/em>. (quoting <em>Matter of R-A-<\/em>, 22 I&amp;N Dec at 920). In supporting his repeated reli\u00adance on <em>R-A-<\/em>, Sessions points to the BIA\u2019s and other courts ongoing footnote reliance. <em>Matter of A-B<\/em>-, 27 I&amp;N Dec. at 329 (quoting M-E-V-G-, 26 I&amp;N Dec. at 231 n.7 (BIA 2014) (<em>R-A<\/em>-\u2018s \u201crole in progression of particular social group claims remains relevant\u201d; <em>Henriquez-Rivas<\/em>, 707 F.3d at 1090 n.11 (\u201c<em>R-A <\/em>was later vacated[,]\u2026litigants and other courts have relied heavily upon its analysis.\u201d); <em>Valdiviezo-Galdamez<\/em>, 663 F.3d 567-97, n 8 \u201c<em>R-A<\/em>&#8211; is so important to the claim before us here.\u201d). For earlier discussion of <em>R-A-<\/em>and its history see <em>supra <\/em>note 3 and accompanying text.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"58\">\n<li><em>PROPOSED REG, supra <\/em>note 3 at 76593 (emphasis added).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"59\">\n<li><em>Ibid. <\/em>at 75694.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"60\">\n<li><em>Matter of A-B-<\/em>, <em>supra <\/em>note 1 at 337 (quoting <em>Menjivar v. Gonzales<\/em>, 416 F3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting <em>Matter of McMullen<\/em>, 17 I&amp;N Dec. 542, 546 (BIA 1980)).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"61\">\n<li><em>Matter of A-B-<\/em>, <em>supra <\/em>note 1 at 337 (quoting <em>Galina v. INS<\/em>, 213 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 2000) <em>see also <\/em>Hor, 400 F.3d, <em>supra <\/em>at 485.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"62\">\n<li><em>Ibid. <\/em>(BIA remands to the IJ on whether government unable or unwilling to control the persecutor).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"63\">\n<li><em>Ibid. <\/em>(\u201cThe fact that the local police have not acted on a particular report of an individual crime does not necessarily mean that the government is unwilling or unable to control crime, any more than it would in the United States. There may be many reasons why a particular crime is not successfully investigated and prosecuted. Applicants must show not just that the crime has gone unpunished, but that the government is unwilling or unable to prevent it.\u201d).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"64\">\n<li><em>Ibid. <\/em>at 338.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"65\">\n<li><em>Ibid. <\/em>(quoting <em>A-R-C-G-<\/em>, 26 I&amp;N Dec. at 392, 395). For additional instances of <em>A-B-<\/em>\u2019s criticism of the BIA for failing to engage in its own analysis see <em>supra <\/em>note 22-27 and accompanying text.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"66\">\n<li><em>Ibid. <\/em>at 339.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"67\">\n<li><em>INS v. Elias-Zacarias<\/em>, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"68\">\n<li><em>Ibid. <\/em><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"69\">\n<li><em>Ibid. <\/em><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"70\">\n<li><em>Ibid. <\/em><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"71\">\n<li><em>Ibid. <\/em><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"72\">\n<li><em>In re S-P-<\/em>, 21 I&amp; N Dec. 486, 489 (BIA 1996). For further discussion of the \u201cimputed political opinion\u201d theory after Elias-Zacarias see Stephen H. Legomsky &amp; Cristina M. Rodriguez, Immigration And Refugee Law And Policy 943-49 (6th ed. 2015).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"73\">\n<li><em>In re S-P-<\/em>, <em>supra <\/em>note 72.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"74\">\n<li><em>In re V-T-S-<\/em>, 21 I&amp; N Dec. 792, 798 (BIA, 1997). For further discussion of the \u201cone central reason\u201d standard see <em>supra <\/em>note 47 and accompanying text.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"75\">\n<li><em>INS v. Elias-Zacarias<\/em>, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992) (the applicant \u201cmust provide some evidence of [motive], direct or circumstantial.\u201d).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"76\">\n<li><em>In re D-V-<\/em>, 21 I. &amp; N. 77, 79 (BIA 1993). Notably, <em>D-V- <\/em>was also \u201con account of political opinion\u201d and not based on gender or any other derivation of \u201cmembership in a particular social group.\u201d For my earlier advocacy of relying upon one of the alternative four \u201con account of factors of \u201cpolitical opinion, race, religion or political opinion\u201d see <em>supra <\/em>notes 46-51 and accompanying text.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"77\">\n<li><em>Castillo-Hernandez v. U.S. Attorney General<\/em>, 297 Fed. Appx. 894, 897-898 (11th Cir. 2008).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"78\">\n<li><em>Ibid. <\/em><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"79\">\n<li><em>Ibid. <\/em>at 900.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"80\">\n<li><em>Matter of S-P-<\/em>, <em>supra <\/em>note 72 at 490.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"81\">\n<li><em>Ibid. <\/em>(quoting <em>Matter of Fuentes<\/em>, 19 I &amp; N Dec. 658. 622 (BIA 1988); <em>see also In re V-T-S-<\/em>, 21 I&amp; N Dec. at 798 (applicant bears burden of proving one motivation for kidnapping wealthy business owners in Philippines related to five factors).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"82\">\n<li>In <em>Navas v. INS<\/em>, when police beat and threatened the spouse of a \u201cknown dissident,\u201d the Ninth Circuit deemed it \u201clogical, in the absence of evidence pointing to another motive, to conclude that they did so because of the spouse\u2019s presumed guilt by associa\u00adtion.\u201d <em>Navas v. <\/em>INS, 217 F.3d 646, 658 (9th Cir. 2000); <em>see also Meza-Manay v. INS<\/em>, 139 F.3d 759, 764 (9th Cir. 1980) (no other explanation or better evidence); <em>Ventura<\/em>, 264 F.3d at 1154 (direct or circumstantial guilt by association); <em>Del Carmen Molina v. INS<\/em>, 170 .3d 1247, 1249 (9th Cir 1999) (guilt by association or direct evidence); <em>Rios v. Ashcroft<\/em>, 287 F.3d 895 (9th Cir 2002).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"83\">\n<li><em>Matter of A-B-<\/em>, <em>supra <\/em>note 1 at 339. For earlier discussion of such remark see <em>infra <\/em>notes\u2026and accompanying text.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"84\">\n<li>For earlier discussions of this criticism see <em>supra <\/em>notes 22-27 and accompanying text.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"85\">\n<li><em>Matter of A-B-<\/em>, <em>supra <\/em>note 1 at 344.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"86\">\n<li><em>Matter of M-Z-M-R<\/em>, 26 I&amp;N Dec. 28 (BIA 2012).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"87\">\n<li><em>Ibid. <\/em><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"88\">\n<li>8 C.F.R. \u00a71208.13(b)(1)(ii); <em>see also Matter of M-Z-M-R<\/em>, <em>supra <\/em>note 86 at 34.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"89\">\n<li>8 C.F.R. \u00a7 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B); <em>see also Matter of M-Z-M-R<\/em>, <em>supra <\/em>note 86 at 34.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"90\">\n<li><em>Ibid. <\/em><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"91\">\n<li>8 C.F.R. \u00a7 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(A); <em>see also Matter of M-Z-M-R<\/em>, <em>supra <\/em>note 86 at 31; <em>Matter of L-S-<\/em>, 25 I&amp;N Dec. 705 (BIA 2012).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"92\">\n<li>8 C.F.R. \u00a7 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(B); <em>see also Matter of M-V-M-R<\/em>, <em>supra <\/em>note 86 at 31; <em>Matter of L-S-<\/em>, <em>supra <\/em>note 91.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"93\">\n<li><em>Matter of Chen<\/em>, 20 I&amp;N 16 (BIA 1989).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"94\">\n<li>8 C.F.R. \u00a7 1208.13(b)(3)(i); <em>see also Matter of M-Z-M-R<\/em>, <em>supra <\/em>note 86 at 33 n.5 (citing <em>Matter of C-A-L-<\/em>, 21 I&amp;N Dec. 754, 757 (BIA 1997) (Guatemela internal relocation; guerrillas located in remote areas, threats to general population decreased, low-profile victims able to relocate); Matter of R-, 20 I&amp;N at 627 (India internal relocation outside of Punjab); <em>Matter of Acosta<\/em>, 19 I&amp;N Dec. 211, 236 (BIA 1985), <em>modified on other grounds in Matter of Mogharrabi<\/em>, 19 I&amp;N Dec. 439 (BIA 1987) (El Salvador internal relocation, guerrillas not persecuting taxi drivers country-wide).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"95\">\n<li>8 C.F.R. \u00a7 1208.13(b)(3)(i).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"96\">\n<li>For a review of each of asylum\u2019s criteria see <em>supra <\/em>notes 54-59 and accompanying text (persecution); <em>supra <\/em>notes 14-51 and accompanying text (membership in a particular social group), <em>supra <\/em>notes 65-84 and accompanying text (\u201con account of\u201d).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"97\">\n<li><em>Matter of A-B-<\/em>, <em>supra <\/em>note 1.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"98\">\n<li>For the story of the impossibility of one survivor to internal relocate see Pamela Constable, \u201cHe Forced Me Many Times. I Ran Away But He Always Found Me Again.\u201d WashingtonPost (Jan 31, 2016).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"99\">\n<li>\u201cWhen the applicant has suffered personal harm at the hands of only a few specific individuals, internal relocation would seem more reasonable than if the applicant were persecuted, broadly, by her country\u2019s government.\u201d <em>Matter of A-B-<\/em>, <em>supra <\/em>note 1 at 345.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"100\">\n<li>Martha Mahoney\u2019s separation assault theory explains how difficult it is to escape. Mahoney <em>supra <\/em>note 32 at 65-66: \u201cSeparation Assault is the attack on the woman\u2019s body and volition in which her partner seeks to prevent her from leaving, retaliate for the separation, or force her to return. It aims at overbearing her will as to where and with whom she will live, and coercing her in order to enforce connection in a relation\u00adship. It is an attempt to gain, retain, or regain power in a relationship, or to punish the woman for ending the relationship. It often takes place over time.\u201d<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Linda Kelly Linda Kelly is the M. Dale Palmer Professor of Law at the Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law, where she is also Director of the Law &amp; Immigration Clinic. &nbsp; On June 11, 2018, Attorney General Sessions published his opinion in Matter of A-B- 1 and overruled Matter of A-R-C-G-.2 In [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":32,"featured_media":0,"menu_order":63,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_kad_blocks_custom_css":"","_kad_blocks_head_custom_js":"","_kad_blocks_body_custom_js":"","_kad_blocks_footer_custom_js":"","footnotes":"","_members_access_role":[],"_members_access_error":""},"categories":[],"tags":[],"issuem_issue":[118],"class_list":["post-322","article","type-article","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","issuem_issue-nlg-review-vol-75-no-2-summer-2018","post"],"aioseo_notices":[],"aioseo_head":"\n\t\t<!-- All in One SEO 5.0.0.1 - aioseo.com -->\n\t<meta name=\"description\" content=\"Linda Kelly Linda Kelly is the M. 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